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INTRODUCTION

The juvenile justice system is currently under attack on two broad fronts.
First, legal experts and commentators are providing stinging critiques of the
system's failure to protect the liberty and due process interests of juveniles.'
* Donna M. Bishop is associate professor of criminal justice and legal studies at the
University of Central Florida. Her current research focuses on recent reforms in Florida and
their impact on offenders and justice systems. Lonn Lanza-Kaduce is professor of
criminology and sociology at the University of Florida. His most recent publications cover
research ranging from juvenile justice policy and policing to drunk driving. Charles E. Frazier
is professor of sociology and an affiliate professor in the Center for Studies in Criminology
and Law at the University of Florida. His current research is focused on the effects of
Florida's 1994 Juvenile Justice Act and its implications for national policies relating to crime
control.
1. Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing the American Juvenile Court, in 17 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 197 (Michael Tonry ed., 1993) [hereinafter
Criminalizing];Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of
Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927 (1995) [hereinafter Youth Justice]; Janet E.
Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for
Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1083 (1991) [hereinafter Re-imagining];

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

130

[Vol. 10

Second, legislators throughout the country are supporting more and more
legislation designed to "get tough" on juvenile crime.2 In combination, these
criticisms and reforms advance the "recriminalization" of juvenile offenders.
Juvenile offenders are increasingly subject to adult standards of culpability
and punishment. Most of this change in the way we think about and
officially respond to juvenile crime has proceeded without a discussion of the
empirical effects of imposing adult status on juveniles. The purpose of this
article is to introduce that missing element and to consider the wisdom of
current policy trends in light of relevant research and theory.
Part II of this article considers challenges to the juvenile justice system
and the nature of recent reforms, especially those that attribute adult status
to juveniles. The reforms and their historical development are examined in
order to appreciate more fully the dynamics of the reform movement. Part
III discusses studies that compare the benefits of processing youth as adults
in the criminal justice system with traditional juvenile justice processing,
concluding that the research does not support the pace and the direction of
current reforms. Part IV employs Braithwaite's theoretical framework to
interpret these findings and to consider why juveniles may fare better under
juvenile as opposed to adult court jurisdictions. Part V concludes that a
moratorium on the criminalization of juvenile offenders is needed in order to
develop a more informed policy.

Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposalfor the Preservation
of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23 (1990); Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile
Court: Affirming PersonalResponsibility, 2 JUV. JUST. UPDATE 4 (1996) [hereinafter Abolish];
Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991)

[hereinafter Transformation]; Francis Barry McCarthy, Should Juvenile Delinquency Be
Abolished?, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 196 (1977); Stephen Wizner & Mary F. Keller, The Penal
Model of Juvenile Justice: Is Juvenile Court Delinquency JurisdictionObsolete?, 52 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1120 (1977).
2.

PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES

TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME (1996); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets
the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L.

& CRIMINOLOGY 471, 472-73 (1987). In more and more states, youths are photographed and
finger-printed at arrest, records are no longer confidential, court proceedings are open to the
public, and proceedings are increasingly adversarial. TORBET ET AL., supra at 34-45.
Determinate sentencing has been introduced into juvenile courts, and many courts have the
authority to impose sentences that extend well into the adult years. Id. at 11-24. Several
states have lowered the maximum age of their juvenile courts' original jurisdiction. Id. at 3.
Methods and criteria for transferring youths to adult court have been expanded. Id. at 3-9;
Feld, supra at 472-73.
3. SIMON I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY: VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME AND

JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM (1996). By "recriminalization," Singer means the deconstruction
of the image of delinquents as misguided but innocent children, and then a reconstruction that
portrays them as adult-like criminals - fully culpable for their acts. Id. at 46-74.
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II.

THE CHALLENGE TO JUVENILE JUSTICE

Courts have long had the ability to transfer young offenders from
juvenile to criminal courts.4 Transfer provisions were rarely utilized,
however, and were nonproblematic as long as the juvenile justice system
remained firmly grounded in a parens patriaeorientation.5 The task of the
traditional juvenile court and its ancillary support services, such as child
guidance clinics and juvenile probation departments, was to focus on the
whole child - not merely, or even primarily, on his or her offense - to
make a diagnosis, and implement an individualized treatment plan.6 Despite
periodic criticism of the juvenile justice system, supporters in the early years
of the court's existence remained optimistic about the inherent malleability
of youth and the potential for their reform.'
However, beginning in the 1960s, a complex set of events and forces
converged to threaten the juvenile justice system's philosophical underpinnings as well as its practices.8 Out of this, a new jurisprudence emerged that
justified punishment and at the same time, debunked the beneficent origins
and purposes of the juvenile court. 9 Exaggerated accounts of juvenile crime
and disenchantment with rehabilitation in general also fed the "get tough"
political reforms that have become a new jurisprudence.' ° Perhaps the most
critical feature of this jurisprudence has been the expansion of transfer
provisions which allow or mandate that growing numbers of juvenile
offenders be treated as adults.
A.

A New Jurisprudencefor Juvenile Offenders

Many legal scholars want to reform the juvenile justice system by
providing better protection of the liberty and due process interests of
juveniles," but they adopt different positions on how this should be

4. Barbara Flicker, Prosecuting Juveniles as Adults: A Symptom of a Crisis in the
Juvenile Courts, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING:
READINGS INPUBLIC POLICY 351, 351 (John C. Hall et al. eds., 1981); Julian W. Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 104-06 (1909); Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik,
ProsecutingJuveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis, 76 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 439, 449-51 (1985).
5. See Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 4, at 450.
6. Feld, supra note 2, at 474-78.
7. JOHN R. SUTrON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1640-1981, at 90 (1988).
8. See id. at 200-01.
9. See id. at 204-05.
10. See id. at 202-03.
11. See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
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accomplished. For example, Ainsworth, 12 McCarthy, 13 Federle, 4 Wizner
and Keller, 5 and Feld 16 have advocated elimination of the juvenile justice
system altogether. They argue that this would advance the liberty interests
of all persons under eighteen years of age.' 7 Melton, by contrast, has
proposed a new juvenile court that would recognize age-graded sanctioning
and procedural protections."8 More recently, Ainsworth and Feld have
proposed unifying the juvenile and criminal justice systems. 9 In her more
recent proposal, Ainsworth advocates radically altering the juvenile and adult
systems and creating a new unified system that eliminates adult-child
distinctions and better protects the liberty interests of both.20 Feld also
proposes unifying the juvenile and adult courts but would provide a "youth
discount" at sentencing. 2'
Despite some differences, these legal scholars all commend a new
jurisprudence for juvenile offenders.2 To various degrees, each scholar
rejects the basic child-adult distinction and argues that juveniles (past
infancy) have the capacity to make adult-like decisions.2 3 In turn, each
embraces the legitimacy of punishment, and responsibility and accountability,
all in the name of protecting the liberty interests of juveniles. 2 4 This new
jurisprudence grows out of, but is different from, the rationales of
constitutional rulings in juvenile cases.
The Supreme Court initiated constitutional protections for juvenile
offenders by examining the waiver of juveniles to criminal court in Kent v.
United States. 25 The Supreme Court introduced procedural formality into
the judicial waiver process, requiring, inter alia, a hearing, effective
assistance of counsel, and a statement of reasons for transfer.2 6 The Court
recommended criteria to assure that transfer would be applied only to those
for whom treatment as a juvenile offender was inappropriate. 27 Subse-

12. Ainsworth, Re-imagining, supra note 1, at 927.
13. McCarthy, supra note 1, at 196.
14. Federle, supra note 1, at 23.

15. Wizner & Keller, supra note 1, at 1120.
16. Feld, supra note 2, at 471.

17. See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
18. Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L.

REV. 146, 167-72 (1989).
19. Ainsworth, Re-imagining, supra note 1, at 1085; Feld, Transformation, supra note 1,
at 722-25.
20. Ainsworth, Youth Justice, supra note 1, at 944-51.
21. Feld, Criminalizing, supra note 1, at 264; Feld, Transformation, supra note 1, at 724.

,22. See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
23. See id.
24. See id.

25. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
26. Id. at 560-62.
27. Id. at 560-61.
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quently, the National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention issued the influential "Standards for the Administration of
Juvenile Justice," which followed the recommendations of the Court in Kent
and the American Bar Association's Juvenile Justice Standards Project.28
The Kent decision was quickly followed by In re Gault, in which the
Court scrutinized both juvenile court procedures and correctional practices.2 9
The treatment offered by the juvenile justice system had been the quid pro
quo for procedural informality. In Gault, the Court observed that what was
called "treatment" often involved deprivation of liberty for several years in
It
conditions that resembled those of adult correctional facilities.3"
concluded that such a result could only be justified following a hearing that
safeguards
comports with due process. 3 ' Consequently, the Court mandated
32
to reduce the risk of erroneous adjudications of delinquency.
In 1970, the Court underscored its concern with unfair and error-prone
court procedures in In re Winship.33 The Court explicitly adopted "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" as the evidentiary standard to be used in juvenile
34
The standard was given constitutional grounding in the due process
court.
clauses.35
These constitutional rulings recognized the due process interests of
The new
juveniles, but they did not equate juveniles with adults.
jurisprudence advocated by recent critics of the juvenile justice system
transforms the basic rationale of the Supreme Court's Kent-Gault-Winship
trilogy. Whereas the Court insisted on basic due process protections when

28. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, STANDARDS
Standard 3:116 of the
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 262-63 (1980).
National Advisory Committee recommends transfer only where:
There is probable cause to believe that the act alleged ... is of a heinous or
aggravated nature, or that the juvenile has committed repeated serious delinquency
offenses; and ... [t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile is not
amenable to treatment . . . because of the seriousness of the alleged conduct, the
juvenile's record of prior adjudicated offenses, and the inefficacy of each of the
dispositions available to the ...

Id. at 262; see also
JUSTICE STANDARDS

court.

AMERICAN BAR ASS'N JUVENILE
INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS,

Standard 2.2 (1980) (recommending similar probable cause guidelines).
29. 387 U.S. 1, 20-26 (1967). The Court's extension of procedural rights to juveniles
represents a further manifestation of its general orientation to limit the coercive powers of the
state. The "due process revolution" of the Warren Era is most widely recognized in the
criminal law context. Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 4, at 453.
30. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.
31. Id. at 27-28.
32. Id. at 33-58.
33. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
34. Id. at 368.
35. Id. at 367-68.
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punishment compromised the treatment ideal, these critics, in effect, now
advocate punishment and the compromise of treatment because of the due
process ideal.
Dicta in the Gault and Winship decisions acknowledged that juvenile
36
justice dispositions are punitive in effect, despite the "treatment" rhetoric.
The effort to protect liberty interests because of punitive features of
"treatment," however, inadvertently undercut the treatment rationale of
juvenile justice. By the time the court restated its endorsement of the
rehabilitative ideal in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,37 the departure from a
treatment orientation had already begun. As Feld 38 has cogently observed,
by shifting the focus of the juvenile court's fact-finding from the needs of the
"whole child" to proof of the commission of criminal acts,39 the Court
decisions unintentionally shifted the focus from diagnosis and rehabilitation
to culpability and punishment. Although the Court's stated intent was to
alter only the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile justice process, n° it unwittingly laid the jurisprudential foundation for an unprecedented and explicit
focus on punishment as a rationale for juvenile sentencing. The eventual
effect of these decisions was to narrow the gap between juvenile and criminal
court dispositions and correctional goals.
Once the discourse of punishment had been introduced into court
opinions, reforms and practices based on punishment were given legitimacy.
The shift away from child-focused to offense-based dispositions dramatically
increased the proportion of children for whom lengthy punishment became
appropriate. 41 Age limits on the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, however,

36. Id. at 365-66; Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.
37. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say that, despite
disappointments of grave dimensions, it still does not hold promise, and we are
particularly reluctant to say .. . that the system cannot accomplish its rehabilitative
goals. So much depends on the availability of resources, on the interest and
commitment of the public, on willingness to learn, and on understanding as to cause
and effect and cure. . . . We are reluctant to disallow the States to experiment
further and to seek in new and different ways the elusive answers to the problems
of the young.
Id. at 547.
38. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 821 (1988); see also Feld,
supra note 2, at 486-87; Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court,
31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 507 (1984).
39. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543-44 & n.5.
40. Id. at 550.
41. One way in which the juvenile system has tried to respond is through increasing the
maximum age of jurisdiction for sanctions. TORBET ET AL., supra note 2, at 15. This is an
effort to keep juveniles in a separate system but to satisfy offense-based "just deserts" criteria.
Id.
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came to be seen by some as an obstacle to appropriate punishment.42
Transfer provisions were an available and practical vehicle through which
lengthier sentences could be achieved.4 3
The new jurisprudence was also facilitated by revisionist histories. In
1966, an influential work by Platt 44 challenged the purposes and motives of
the Progressive reformers, under whose auspices the juvenile justice system
had been created.45 Sinister motives were attached to the Progressives in
ways that challenged the juvenile court.4 6 Its treatment orientation was cast

as a "cover" for extending social control over the children of the poor and
especially, the children of immigrants.47

Platt's critique denied the

legitimacy of the juvenile justice system.48 In effect, this line of attack
provided a second ideological justification to turn to the adult criminal justice
system when dealing with young offenders.
B.

"Doing Something" About Juvenile Crime

Legislators seem conspicuously unpersuaded by scholarly commentaries.
They are influenced more by perceptions of rising juvenile crime rates,
especially for violent crime.49 There is no doubt that highly publicized
media accounts of violent juvenile crime have played into public fears and
frustration and have contributed to politically charged calls for action to
insure public safety.5"

42. See Feld, supra note 2, at 485-87.
43. See id. at 486-87.
44. ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 176-81
(1969); see also Barry C. Feld, Progressivismand the Control of Youth: The Emergence of
the Juvenile Justice System, in LAW AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CRIMINAL LAW 173, 180 (James H. Inverarity et al. eds., 1983).
45. Traditional historical accounts maintained that the Progressives were motivated by a
humanitarian spirit. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND
ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 206-07 (1980). Armed with a faith in science
and an enlightened belief in the possibility of reform, they attempted to combat crime,
poverty, disease, and other social ills wrought by nineteenth century urbanization and industrialization by instituting a host of legal and social reforms. Id. at 206. Along with the
establishment of the juvenile court, they were responsible for child labor laws, compulsory
school attendance laws, and child welfare laws. Id.; see Feld, Criminalizing,supra note 1,
at 202. For further discussion, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
46. See PLATT, supra note 44, at 176-77.
47. See id. at 67-74.
48. See id. at 172-75.
49. See SINGER, supra note 3, at 5-23.
50. Mary Fairchild has commented, "Legislators get their information from news reports
and their constituents and only rarely from justice practitioners and members of the research
community." Mary Fairchild, "Changing State and Local Legislation," Presentation at the
OJJDP National Conference on Juvenile Justice at the Crossroads (Baltimore, Dec. 1996) (on
file with author); see SINGER, supra note 3, at 46-74; Melissa H. Barlow et al., Economic
Conditions and Ideologies of Crime in the Media: A Content Analysis of Crime News, 41
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Talk about juvenile crime in terms of a juvenile crime rate "explosion"
is hyperbole. In fact, after increasing in the 1960s, rates of juvenile arrests
leveled off and decreased in the mid-1970s, and then increased modestly in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. 5 Recent increases, though not as large as
those of a generation ago, have occurred disproportionately in crimes of
violence, especially among minority youth.52
Disproportionate attention given both to increases in juvenile violence
and to alarmist portrayals of a new breed of juvenile offender has fueled
public fears and stepped up demands for juvenile justice reform.53 Because
juvenile post-disposition jurisdiction terminates in most states at age eighteen
or twenty-one, juvenile sanctions are perceived as inappropriately lenient for
violent crimes, especially in light of the new jurisprudence, which emphasizes

CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 16 (1995). The media has contributed to impressions of juvenile crime
waves in other time periods as well. Mark Fishman, Crime Wave As Ideology, 25 Soc.

PROBS. 531, 532-33 (1978).
For a discussion of the role of the media in law formation, see Richard C. Hollinger
& Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Process of Criminalization:The Case of Computer Crime Laws,
26 CRIMINOLOGY 101, 105-07 (1988). They argue that the media convey a sense of frequency

about a phenomenon, and that the amount of media attention is more important for legal
change than is the objective frequency of the problem behavior. Id. at 106. The media also
can stress themes that convey a sense of normative threat that invites legislative responses.
Id. at 107. Inasmuch as utility is a cultural value, reformers advance deterrent rationales. In
so doing, they also obtain favorable publicity for themselves. That public perception helped
to create a political imperative to "do something," namely to "get tough" on juvenile crime.
51. LARRY J. SIEGEL & JOSEPH J. SENNA, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: THEORY, PRACTICE,
34 (4th ed. 1991) (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., REPORT TO THE NATION ON

AND LAW

CRIME AND JUSTICE (1989)); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995 (1996).

52. James C. Howell et al., Trends in Juvenile Crimes and Youth Violence, in A
SOURCEBOOK: SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS 1-2 (James C. Howell
et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter A SOURCEBOOK]. To be sure, there was an increase in violent

arrests among juveniles, but the increase in adult arrests for these same offenses was much
greater. Id. at 2. Media attention to these crime statistics, in particular, has overstated the
actual increases in juvenile homicide and violence by placing disproportionate emphasis on
percentage increases computed on small bases. Note how calculations of percentage increases
can overdramatize. Between 1980 and 1992, the juvenile homicide arrest rate increased from
6.4 per 100,000 to 11.7 per 100,000, an increase of 5.3 homicides per 100,000 juveniles.
When translated to percentages, however, this represents an increase of 82.8%.
53. See WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY ... AND HOW TO
WIN AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 25-26 (1996). They argue:
America is now home to thickening ranks of juvenile "super-predators" - radically
impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters, including ever more pre-teenage boys,

who murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs,
and create serious communal disorders. They do not fear the stigma of arrest, the
pains of imprisonment, or the pangs of conscience.
Id. at 27; see also JAMES ALAN Fox, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRENDS IN JUVENILE VIOLENCE:

A

REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL ON CURRENT AND FUTURE RATES

OF JUVENILE OFFENDING 1-5 (1996).
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offense-based sentencing. 4
The trend toward attributing culpability to juvenile offenders and
punishing them has met little resistance, in part because rehabilitation has lost
credibility. Misgivings about the adequacy of the juvenile justice system
were reinforced by researchers who, in the 1960s,55 began to question the
viability of the rehabilitative ideal on which the system was founded. In
1974, the highly publicized "Martinson Report" provided an appraisal of
correctional treatment strategies and outcomes and concluded that "nothing
works. '5 6 Martinson and his colleagues suggested that it was futile to
attempt to rehabilitate offenders and recommended that the objectives of
deterrence and incapacitation be adopted instead.57 Martinson later recanted
his conclusions.58 Subsequently, numerous reports were published showing
demonstrable reductions in recidivism attributable to various treatment
These supporting reports notwithstanding, defenders of
programs. 5 9
rehabilitation have become ever more scarce. 60
The perception among politicians is that electoral success is linked to

54. See Feld, supra note 2, at 471.

55. H. Ted Rubin,

JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND LAW

53 (2d ed. 1985).

56. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INTEREST 22-54 (1974);

see also

DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

439 (1975);
William E. Wright & Michael C. Dixon, Community Prevention and Treatment of Juvenile
Delinquency: A Review of Evaluation Studies, 14 J.RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 35 (1977).
Legal change has been linked to the activities of reformers. In juvenile and criminal
law developments, these reformers are often "experts." John Hagan, The Legislation of Crime
and Delinquency: A Review of Theory, Method, and Research, 14 L. & SOC'Y REV. 603, 60305 (1980); Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 50, at 101.
57. See Martinson, supra note 56, at 22-54.
58. Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding
Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 243, 252 (1979).
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES

59.

TED PALMER, THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CORRECTIONAL INTERVENTIONS

(1992); Mark

W. Lipsey, Juvenile Delinquency Treatment: A Meta-Analytic Inquiry into the Variability of
Effects, in META-ANALYSIS FOR EXPLANATION: A CASEBOOK 83 (Thomas D. Cook ed.,
1992); D.A. Andrews et al., Does CorrectionalTreatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and
Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1990); Carol J. Garrett,
Effects of Residential Treatment on Adjudicated Delinquents:A Meta-Analysis, 22 J. RES. IN
CRIME & DELINQ. 287 (1985); Paul Gendrea & Robert R. Ross, Revivification of
Rehabilitation: Evidence from the 1980's, 4 JUST. Q. 349, 395 (1987); Edward P. Mulvey et
al., The Prevention and Treatment of Juvenile Delinquency: A Review of the Research, 13
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV.

133, 158-59 (1993); Ted Palmer, Programmaticand Nonprogram-

matic Aspects of Successful Intervention: New Directionsfor Research, 41 CRIME & DELINQ.
100 (1995).
60. FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION (1982);
BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AUSTIN, REINVENTING JUVENILE JUSTICE (1993); IRA M.
SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1989).
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support for repressive crime control strategies. 6' The politics of reform
have become the politics of punishment. To "do something," politicians
advocate punishment and support reforms that center on punishment.62
C.

The Recent Reforms

Political and legislative efforts to reform juvenile justice have been
impressive, and their intent cannot be mistaken. Unlike the legal scholars'
focus on due process and liberty interest rationales for juvenile reform, the
political and legislative agenda purports to be a utilitarian response to
concerns about public safety. The utility of the reforms is taken entirely on
faith. Accurate, reliable outcome data and empirical research have rarely
been included in the reform discussion.
The central features of the legislative reform agenda are developed
below. They include the following: (1) many state juvenile codes now
explicitly endorse the aims of punishment, accountability, and protection of
public safety, 63 (2) many juvenile courts operate under offense-based
philosophies, as indicated by determinate sentencing schemes, extended
jurisdiction statutes, and mandatory minimum sentences, 64 and (3) reforms
have made it easier to transfer juvenile offenders to criminal courts.65
The intent of the reform agenda is evident from the statement-of-purpose
clauses in state juvenile codes. 6 6 As of 1991, thirty-nine states incorporated
statements of juvenile justice philosophy into their codes. 67 Nearly twothirds of the thirty-nine endorsed punishment in some way.68 Over onethird of the thirty-nine recognized punishment as the sole objective of the
juvenile system. 69 Just three years earlier, less than a quarter of statutory
purpose clauses had recognized punishment as a goal of the juvenile
70
system.
Similarly, the intent of the legislators is apparent from the shift from

61. Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in 16 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99, 101 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992).
62. See id.
63. See TORBET ET AL., supra note 2, at 11-24.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 3-9.
66. Statement-of-purpose clauses use language such as "holding offenders accountable for
criminal behavior," "provide effective deterrents, "punish consistent with the seriousness of
the crime," and "protection of the public from criminal activity." HOWARD N. SNYDER &
MELISSA

SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND

VICTIMS:

A

NATIONAL REPORT 72 (1995).
67. Id. at 71 (citing LINDA SZYMANSKI, JUVENILE CODE PURPOSE CLAUSES (Nat'l Ctr.
for Juvenile Justice 1991)).

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Feld, Criminalizing, supra note 1, at 245-46.
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indeterminate sanctions, which are consistent with treatment needs, to
determinate and offense-based sanctions. In 1980, the Institute of Judicial
Administration of the American Bar Association endorsed sentencing
proportionate to the offense and injury. 71 Feld has reviewed the extent to
which offense-based sanctions have altered juvenile courts across the
country.72 The most extreme example of offense-based sanctioning today
is found in the Texas juvenile code, which permits the juvenile court to
impose sentences of up to forty years for specified felonies. 73 Other states
have chosen to punish beyond the usual age limits of the juvenile court more
generally. Eleven states and the District of Columbia have recently extended
the maximum age of the juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction over youths
committed to juvenile institutions to age twenty-one, or in some cases, to age
twenty-five.74 Mandatory minimum sentences also bear witness to the new
importance of offense-based sanctions. Since 1992, fifteen states and the
District of Columbia have enacted or modified statutes providing for
mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders.75
The magnitude of the shift to a punishment emphasis is seen in the
staggering pace and the impact of reforms that address who is removed from
the juvenile system. Between 1992 and 1995 alone, forty states adopted or
modified laws making it easier to prosecute juveniles in criminal courts.76

This was accomplished by lowering the maximum age of juvenile court
jurisdiction and by transferring juveniles into criminal court. Thirteen states
have now lowered the maximum age of juvenile jurisdiction to fifteen or
sixteen years of age. 77 Estimates for 1991 indicate that 176,000 youths
were brought into adult court by these lower age jurisdictions. 8

AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, JUVENILE JUSTICE
71. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS,

Standard 5.2 (1980). Determinate sentencing, which represented a criminal justice reform of
the 1970s, was extended to the juvenile justice system more recently. Feld, Criminalizing,
supra note 1, at 246-50.
72. Feld, supra note 38, at 832-96; Feld, supra note 2, at 483-503. As of 1988, one-third
of the states used offense-based criteria to regulate decisions on juvenile institutional commitment and release. Feld, supra note 38, at 889-91.
73. 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 262, § 38(d)(3) (codified as amended at TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 54.04(d)(3) (West 1998)). For further discussion of Texas reforms, see Eric J. Fritsch
& Craig Hemmens, An Assessment of Legislative Approaches to the Problem of Serious
Juvenile Crime: A Case Study of Texas 1973-1995, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 563, 594-95 (1996).
74. TORRET ET AL., supra note 2, at 15. Extended jurisdiction statutes permit the juvenile

court to retain jurisdiction over youths committed to state institutions beyond the age of the
juvenile court's original jurisdiction, which typically terminates at age 18. Id.
75. Id. at 14-15.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 3-5; SzYMANSKI, supra note 67, at 2.
78. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A
Focus ON VIOLENCE 28 (1995).
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Transfer statutes have been revised as well. Thirty-six states and the
District of Columbia have legislatively excluded various offenses from
juvenile court jurisdiction. 79 In the last few years, legislatures in thirty-two
of these states have modified their statutes to lower the age limit for juvenile
court jurisdiction, or increase the range of offenses to which exclusion from
the juvenile system applies, or both. 80 As Feld has observed, "The almost
irreversible legislative tendency ... is for lists of excluded offenses to
'
expand."81
Trends reveal steady and significant increases in the use of judicial
waiver in recent years.82 In judicial waiver, the juvenile court relinquishes
jurisdiction over a case after a hearing focused on a youth's amenability to
treatment. In 1995, 13,600 youths nationwide were judicially waived to
criminal court, nearly double the number of youths waived in 1988.83 This
increase is all the more striking considering that a majority of states have
and
recently supplemented judicial waiver with other, less cumbersome
84
exacting, methods for moving young offenders to criminal court.
Another method of transfer is prosecutorial waiver, or "direct file," under
which prosecutors are granted the discretionary authority to file in either
juvenile or criminal court. Unlike judicial waiver or legislative exclusion
statutes, direct file statutes generally provide few guidelines or criteria for the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.86 Usually prosecutorial direct file
decisions are not subject to judicial review. 87 As of 1982, eight states
permitted prosecutorial waiver.88 By 1995, eleven states did, and five had
recently modified their statutes to expand the range of offense and age
classifications to which they applied. 89 The latitude of these statutes is

79. TORBET ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.

80. Id. Other changes also provide evidence of a new punishment orientation. Many
states have altered confidentiality standards. As of 1995, 39 states permit the release of
juveniles' names and photographs to the media under various conditions. Id. at 5. Other
changes include opening of juvenile court proceedings to the public, making juvenile court
records available to the public, expanding the fingerprinting and photographing of juvenile
suspects by law enforcement, and prohibiting sealing or expunging of juvenile records. Id.
at 45.
81. Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1122 (1995).
82.

MELISSA SICKMUND, OJJDP UPDATE ON STATISTICS:

HOw JUVENILES GET TO

CRIMINAL COURT 1 (1994). Currently, about two percent of petitioned delinquency cases are
waived to criminal court. Id.
83. Id.
84. TORBET ET AL., supra note 2, at 3-9.

85. Id. at 3, 7-8.
86. Id. at 7.
87.

Id.

88. Id. at 4.
89. Id.; Feld, Abolish, supra note 1, at 4.
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illustrated by Florida's 1995 law. 9° Under this law, prosecutors have
discretion to file an information in the criminal court (1) on any child age
sixteen or seventeen charged with any felony; 9' (2) on any child age sixteen
or seventeen charged with any misdemeanor if the youth has previously been
adjudicated or had adjudication withheld for two prior offenses, one of which
involved a felony; 92 and (3) on any youth age fourteen or fifteen charged
with one of several enumerated felonies. 93 Florida law mandates direct files
in two instances: when youths age sixteen or seventeen are charged with a
second violent crime against a person, 94 and when youths of any age have
three prior residential commitments and are charged with any subsequent
offense. 9'
III.

THE RESEARCH RECORD ON TREATING JUVENILES AS ADULTS

Transfer is one of the few areas that offers an empirical record that can
be used to assess the utility of many of the recent reforms. The key
utilitarian research question is how adult processing affects the recidivism of
juveniles. Before we can make sense of the recidivism studies, however, we
need to address a preliminary issue. Recidivism studies can shed light on the
relative utility, or disutility, of adult versus juvenile processing only if the
researchers successfully identify similar offenders in both systems. If
juveniles who are treated as adults are systematically different from all other
juveniles (if they are truly the worst of the worse), it will not be possible to
make valid comparisons. Without equivalent comparison groups in the adult
and juvenile systems, we cannot attribute differences in recidivism to
differences in processing.9 6

90. FLA. STAT. § 39.0587, renumbered as § 39.052(3) (1995), repealedby 1997 Fla. Laws
ch. 97-238, § 116. Chapter 97-238 was codifed as Chapter 985 of the Florida Statutes, which
included similar provisions as the former statute for judicial waiver, direct filing, and
sentencing. FLA. STAT. §§ 985.226, .227, .233 (1997) (covering judicial waiver, direct filing,
and sentencing, respectively).
91. FLA. STAT. § 39.052(3)(a)(5)(b)(I) (1995).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 39.052(3)(a)(5)(a)(I)-(XIV).
94. Id. § 39.052(3)(a)(5)(b)(ll).
95. Id. § 39.052(3)(a)(5)(c).
96. Some studies have examined recidivism for reasons other than assessing the relative
efficacy of juvenile versus adult processing. Carole Wolff Barnes & Randal S. Franz,
Questionably Adult: Determinants and Effects on the Juvenile Waiver Decision, 6 JUST. Q.
117 (1989); Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An EmpiricalStudy of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1996); Cary Rudman
et al., Violent Youth in Adult Court: Processand Punishment, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 75 (1986).

They have not established the equivalency between the transferred youth and those retained
in the juvenile system. See id. For example, Podkopacz and Feld report that youths who
were certified to adult court by judges have higher recidivism than others who received
reference motions but were not certified. Podkopacz & Feld, supra at 490. No control other
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Two different strategies have been used to identify equivalent comparison
groups. One is to conduct a cross-jurisdictional analysis where one
jurisdiction routinely brings juveniles into the adult system and another
matched jurisdiction routinely retains the same type of offenders in the
juvenile system.97 The other strategy is to conduct a within-jurisdiction
analysis where each individual who is transferred is carefully matched with
someone retained in the juvenile system.98 This latter approach requires that
the population of transferred youth overlaps that of nontransferred juveniles
so that precise matches can be found.99 Prior research indicates that, at least
in some jurisdictions, the populations are overlapping."
A.

Fagan's Cross-JurisdictionalStudy

The fact that some jurisdictions have legislatively excluded particular

offenses from juvenile jurisdiction, which other jurisdictions handle routinely
as juvenile cases, provides an opportunity to pursue a cross-jurisdictional
analysis. Jeffrey Fagan conducted such research by comparing the recidivism
rates of fifteen- and sixteen-year-old robbery and burglary offenders
processed in two counties in southeastern New York with those handled in
two contiguous counties in northern New Jersey during 1981-1982.'O°
Under New York law, these cases originated in the criminal courts under a

than prosecutorial selection was used. See id. Analyses of the effects of criminal versus
juvenile justice processing require research designs that insure greater equivalence of the
groups under comparison.
Other research controls for offense among different age groups so that juveniles are
compared with young adults to capture the differences between the systems. For example,
Greenwood examined court dispositions of persons aged 16 to 21 charged with armed robbery
and residential burglary in three California jurisdictions.

PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL.,

36
(1983). The obvious nonequivalency in this type of design is age, which may be a critical
factor in recidivism. See id.
97. See infra notes 101-21 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 122-62 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 122-62 and accompanying text.
100. For example, in Florida in 1984, 23% of transfers were first-time offenders and 34%
had only one or two prior offenses. Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of
Juveniles to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of ProsecutorialWaiver, 5 NOTRE
YOUTH CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA: A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE

DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281, 296 (1991).

Moreover, 22% of transfers were mis-

demeanants or drug offenders, and only 20% were charged with personal felonies. Id. at 295.
In 1990, Florida's population of transfers was compared on offense and offense history with
all juveniles committed to "deep end" juvenile justice placements. CHARLES E. FRAZIER,
DEEP END JUVENILE JUSTICE PLACEMENTS OR TRANSFER TO ADULT COURT BY DIRECT FILE:
A REPORT TO THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 11-79 (1991). The groups

were not significantly different in most instances. See id. The "deep end" juvenile cases,
however, were more serious than their transferred counterparts. Id.
101. Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Boys: The Comparative Advantage of
Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders,

in A

SOURCEBOOK,

supra note 52, at 238, 245-60.
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legislative exclusion statute, while in New Jersey, they were processed in
juvenile court. °2 The counties were matched on social structural characteristics and key crime indicators to insure equivalence across sites on factors
that independently influence rates of offending. 0 3 Two hundred cases were
drawn from each county, using a multistage cluster sampling design to reduce
selection bias.' °4 Recidivism was measured through 1989.105 Several
alternative measures of recidivism were constructed: prevalence of rearrest,
prevalence of reincarceration, frequency of rearrest adjusted for time at risk,
and average time to rearrest.' °6
Fagan found a consistent pattern of higher recidivism for robbery
offenders processed in adult court compared with those processed in juvenile
court. 0 7 As to prevalence of rearrests, seventy-six percent of robbery
offenders in criminal court were subsequently rearrested; sixty-seven percent
of those treated as juveniles were rearrested.'0 8 Significant differences were
also found in the prevalence of reincarceration: fifty-six percent of robbers
from the criminal court group were subsequently incarcerated versus fortyone percent of those in the juvenile court group.' °9 Among those who
reoffended, robbers prosecuted in criminal court also had a higher frequency
of rearrest adjusted for time-at-risk (2.85 offenses) than those prosecuted in
juvenile court (1.67 offenses)." 0 The average time to rearrest also differed.
After release, the robbery offenders processed in adult court were rearrested
on average nearly 100 days sooner than were their counterparts processed in
juvenile court (456 versus 553 days)."' There were no significant differen2
ces for burglary offenders between juvenile and criminal court cases."
Among robbery offenders, both sanction type and court type had an
impact on prevalence of rearrest." 3 Criminal sentences, whether probation
or incarceration, produced higher recidivism than did juvenile
dispositions. " 4 Ninety-one percent of those incarcerated in adult facilities
were subsequently rearrested compared to seventy-three percent of those
incarcerated in juvenile facilities." 5 Eighty-one percent of those sentenced

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.

247.
246.
247.
249-50 & tbl.8.4.

250-51 & tbl.8.5.
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to adult probation were subsequently rearrested116 compared to sixty-four
percent of those sentenced to juvenile probation.
Time-to-failure analyses showed similar results." 7 Robbery offenders
sentenced to juvenile facilities took eight months longer to reoffend than
those sentenced to adult facilities (631 days versus 392 days). "8 Again,
there were no significant differences for burglary offenders." 9
Finally, Fagan examined the effects of both court type and sentence
length in a hazard model that simultaneously estimated rearrest prevalence
and time-to-failure. 20 These analyses revealed that increasing the term of
confinement had an insignificant effect on recidivism, while the comparative
advantage of juvenile over criminal court processing was both significant and
substantial.'21
B.

The Florida Studies

Within-jurisdiction research findings from Florida echo the results
reported by Fagan. 122 To overcome the problem of selection bias, we used
a matching procedure to compare cases transferred to criminal court with
equivalent cases retained in the juvenile justice system. 23 Florida transfers
the vast majority of cases to the criminal courts through prosecutorial direct
file under statutory provisions that are extremely broad. 124 As a result,
system that closely resemble
there are many cases retained in the juvenile
25
courts.
criminal
the
to
those transferred
We identified all youths who were transferred to criminal court in the
state during 1987.126 Matches could not be generated for youths charged
with capital and life felonies, as these cases were excluded from juvenile
court jurisdiction. 27 For the remaining transferred youths, we sampled the
nontransfer population using the state's automated offender tracking
system. 28 We matched each transferred youth with a nontransferred youth

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 250-52 & tbl.8.6.
121. Id.
122. Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does It Make
a Difference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 171 (1996); Lawrence Winner et al., The Transfer
of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Reexamining Recidivism over the Long Term, 43 CRIME &
DELINQ. 548, 551-57 (1996).
123. Bishop et al., supra note 122, at 171-72.
124. See id. at 171-73.
125. See id. at 173.
126. Id. at 175-76.
127. Id. at 176.
128. Id.
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on the most serious offense for which the youth was charged, the number of
charges, the number of prior referrals to the juvenile
justice system, the most
l2 9
serious prior offense, age, gender, and race.
We used several outcome measures to tap different dimensions of
recidivism. These included the prevalence and frequency of rearrest,
severity of rearrest charges, and time-to-failure, adjusting for time at risk. 3 '
In the first study, the follow-up period was less than two years, 13' and in
the second study the follow-up was extended to a maximum of seven
32
years. 1
1. The Short-Term Analyses
In the first of our Florida studies, recidivism of 2738 matched pairs was
analyzed through December 31, 1988.133 We found that transfers were
more likely to reoffend than their matches, to have higher rates of prevalence
as a group, to average more subsequent rearrests, to reoffend more
quickly,
134
and to be rearrested for felonies as opposed to misdemeanors.
Looking at each set of matched pairs over the short term, we found that
the probability of rearrest was significantly higher for transferred youths than
for their matches who were retained in the juvenile system. 3 5 In 627 pairs,
the transfer was rearrested but the match was not, and in 347 pairs, the
nontransfer match was rearrested but the transfer was not. 136 We repeated
these analyses for each of seven classes of offense, ordered by level of
severity. 137 For six of the seven comparisons, the probability of rearrest
was significantly higher for offenders prosecuted in criminal court. 38 Even
for the seventh offense class, "minor misdemeanors," more transfers were
rearrested, but the difference was not statistically significant. 139 Prevalence
rates for the respective groups were also computed. Thirty percent of those
transferred to criminal court were rearrested during the initial follow-up
14
compared with nineteen percent of those retained in the juvenile system. 0
Among those rearrested, the average number of subsequent arrests,

129. Id. at 176-77.
130. Id. at 177-78.
131.

Id. at 177.

132. Winner et al., supra note 122, at 550.
133. Bishop et al., supra note 122, at 177.
134. Id. at 183.

135. Id. at 182.
136. Id. at 180 tbl.1.

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 179-80 & tbl.1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182.
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adjusted for time at risk, was higher for the transfer group.14 ' The average
142
number among the transfer group was 1.9 per person-year of exposure.
The average for the group retained in the juvenile system was 1.7 per personyear of exposure. 43 Among those who reoffended, the time-to-failure was
much shorter for the transfers.' 44 The time after release to the first rearrest
versus 227 days in the group
averaged 135 days in the transfer group
45
system.
justice
juvenile
processed in the
Finally, we examined differences in the severity of rearrest offenses
across the two groups. Ninety-three percent of the transferred youths who
reoffended were arrested on felony charges. 146 Eighty-five percent of the
47 The difference,
nontransferred matches were rearrested for felonies.
48
significant.
although not large, was statistically
2.

The Long-Term Analyses

In the second study, we examined the same cases from 1987 but
extended the follow-up through November 15, 1994.149 The findings from
the short-term analyses were replicated for the most part. Results of the
time-to-failure analyses paralleled the short-term findings. 50 Among those
who were rearrested, the subsequent offense occurred more quickly for the
transfers than for those retained in the juvenile system. 15 Among those
charged in 1987 with felony offenses, the respective survival functions of
transfers and nontransfers did not intersect until approximately 3.5 years after
release.'5 2 For those charged in 1987 with misdemeanors, the survival
in the juvenile system never intersected with that
function for those retained
153
for the transfer group.

We also calculated the average number of subsequent arrests overall and
for each of the seven classes of offenses ordered by seriousness. 5 4 Across
all comparisons, the average number of rearrests was higher for those who
had been transferred to criminal court than for those retained in the juvenile

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182-83.
Id. at 183.
Winner et al., supra note 122, at 550.

150. Id. at 555-56.
151. Id. at 555.
152. Id. at 555, 557 & fig.1.
153. Id. at 555, 559 & fig.3.

154. Id. at 556, 560 & tbl.4.
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system. 155 Unlike the short-term findings, the long-term bivariate analysis
of the matched pairs indicated no difference between transfers and
nontransfers in the individual probability of a rearrest during the extended
follow-up period. 15 6 The difference observed in the short-term analysis
disappeared. When we reanalyzed the long-term data by offense class, we
learned the reason for the disappearance. For those who had been charged
with felony property offenses in 1987, the transfers were less likely to be
rearrested over the long term than were their matches who had been retained
in juvenile court."5 7 Because a relatively large proportion of cases involved
property felonies, this offense class offset other significant differences. For
five offense classes, which included drug felonies and lesser felonies as well
as three classes of misdemeanors, transfers were more likely to be rearrested
than their nontransferred matches.1 8 No significant difference in the
probability of rearrest was found for personal felonies in the bivariate
analysis.

159

We then conducted a multivariate analysis of the probability of rearrest.
Rearrest was regressed simultaneously on the criminal/juvenile status of the
case and a series of prediction variables, such as seriousness of offense, prior
record, and number of charges, which operationalized each of the matching
criteria.'60 This analysis permitted us to isolate the effects of transfer while
controlling for other variables, and to determine whether transfer status
interacted with offense type. We found that property felons had an overall
increased risk of rearrest, but this tendency was counteracted when they were
transferred to criminal court. 161 For all other offense classes, however, the
effect of transfer increased the likelihood of recidivism over the long
62
term. 1
C.

The Best Evidence

Fagan's research and the Florida studies point to the conclusion that
transfer is more likely to aggravate recidivism than to prevent it. 163 The
155. Id.
156. Id. at 551-52 & tbl.1.
157. Id. at 552-54 & tbl. 1. Fagan found burglars (included in our property felony class)
to be different from robbers (included in our personal felony class). Fagan, supra note 101,
at 247-51. Recall that Fagan, however, did not find that adult court reduced recidivism among
burglars. See supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
158. Winner et al., supra note 122, at 552 & tbl.1.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 552-55 & tbl.2.
161. Id. at 553-54.
162. Id. at 553.
163. Given that the current transfer reform effort has been instituted to enhance the specific
deterrent/incapacitative effects of what are perceived to be ineffectual juvenile sanctions and
to provide a greater measure of public safety than that afforded by the juvenile courts, then
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net effect of transfer is to increase the likelihood, the rate, and the severity
of reoffending and to decrease the time to rearrest. The recidivism results
compel us to consider why the juvenile and adult systems would produce
different outcomes. If the1 65comparison groups were equivalent,164 then the
systems must be different.

surely it must be judged a failure. We do not address general deterrence here, but we note
that others have found little general deterrent effect. Jensen and Metsger conducted a time
series analysis of two five-year periods preceding and following changes in Idaho's 1981
legislative waiver statute and found no evidence that the rate of violent juvenile crime was
affected. See Eric L. Jensen & Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the DeterrentEffect of Legislative
Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 96, 99-102 (1994). This is consistent
with results from a similar analysis done by Singer and McDowell in New York. See Simon
I. Singer & David McDowell, Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New
York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 521 (1988); see also SINGER, supra note
3.
The recent legislative reforms may primarily have symbolic value rather than utility.
They may assuage a public that clamors for "get tough" policies in a time of growing fear and
frustration. But the empirical record shows that it has little or no substantive value. See
supra notes 101-158 and accompanying test. As Rosenberg warned about abolitionist reforms,
we may be making a bad situation worse. Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough
Alone: A Response to Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WiS. L. REv. 163, 165-84.
164. The different strategies of the Fagan and Florida studies reflect the complexity of
obtaining adequate matches. Fagan controlled for degree of offense by narrowing the range
of offenses he studied. Fagan, supra note 101, at 247. We matched across a wider variety
of offenses. Bishop et al., supra note 122, at 175-77. Fagan matched jurisdictions on a
variety of structural variables like crime rates and socio-economic factors. Fagan, supra note
101, at 246. We did not control for these. Bishop et al., supra note 122, at 175-77. On the
other hand, we matched individuals on prior records, and Fagan did not. Id.; Fagan, supra
note 101, at 247. Both Fagan and we had to make important assumptions in calculating the
time at risk. Bishop et al., supra note 122, at 177-78; Fagan supra note 101, at 247.
Although the Fagan and Florida studies had complementary strengths, they leave some
room for doubt about equivalency. The matching issues are currently being examined by
research funded by OJJDP. For example, in Florida we are examining the local records in
four judicial circuits to obtain more complete information about offense and offender
characteristics for a population of transfers and their computer-generated matches. The circuitlevel matches will control for socio-demographic and economic structural variables. The local
records data will provide more precise information about weapons and injuries, prior records,
and processing decisions, including prehearing release, legal representation, plea bargaining,
restitution, recoupment, etc. In other words, we will learn whether or how much transfers are
systematically different from their computer-generated matches who are retained in the
juvenile system.
165. The arguments of many legal commentaries seem to assume that the juvenile system
already issues punitive (i.e., criminal-like) sanctions, so it focuses on the different (and
inferior) procedural safeguards in the juvenile system. The "get-tough" political agenda
largely ignores the procedural issues and instead criticizes traditional juvenile dispositions for
being even more weak and ineffectual than adult sanctions. The irony is that criticisms of
juvenile justice and findings from recidivism studies seem to accept the position that the
juvenile justice system is different from the adult system. The differences are largely
presumed. They have not been subjected to theoretical or systematic empirical investigation,
especially in terms of how they may affect recidivism.
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IV. THE RESEARCH FINDINGS IN SOCIAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXTS
Three decades of change in the juvenile justice system make it difficult
to assert that any characteristic of the juvenile justice system is unique or that
the system itself is supported by some clear, unifying rationale. 166 Indeed,
differences in juvenile and criminal justice have long been more a matter of
degree than kind. 167 Despite recent points of convergence, however,
several differences remain. In contrast to the criminal justice system, the
juvenile system is more attentive to the offender and the offender's social
circumstances. 168 The juvenile court also incarcerates less often. 169 In
practice, the dispositions of the juvenile court depend more on communitybased programs, small rather than large institutions, and sanctions
that keep
170
models.
role
criminal
sophisticated
more
from
separate
youth
In earlier works, we suggested that several different theories could be
applied to make sense of the recidivism findings, depending upon which
aspect of a very complex set of relationships one considers most impor172
tant. 17 ' Here we invoke Braithwaite's theory of reintegrative shaming.
We select this theory because it is a general theory of crime and social
control, and because it helps make sense of how differences in the adult and
juvenile systems might produce different recidivism results.' 73 In addition,
Braithwaite incorporates and synthesizes central features of social learning

theory, 174

labeling

theory, 175

social

control

theory, 176

opportunity

166. JEROME G. MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL (1991); Gordon Bazemore & Mark
Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court: Retributive or Restorative
Response to Youth Crime, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 296 (1995).
167. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
168. See Francis T. Cullen et al., Is Child Saving Dead? Attitudes Toward Juvenile
Rehabilitationin Illinois, in THE NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE 231 (Martin L. Forst ed., 1995).
169. Fagan, supra note 101, at 248 & tbl.8.2; Podkopacz & Feld, supra note 96, at 454.
It is important to note that sentences actually served by youths transferred to criminal court
are sometimes no longer than sentences that could have been imposed had their cases been
retained in the juvenile system. Fritch, Caeti, and Hemmens show that, at least in Texas
between 1981 and 1993, actual time served in prison by transferred youths was not more than
juveniles could have received in the juvenile courts. Eric J. Fritch et al., Spare the Needle But
Not the Punishment: The Incarceration of Waived Youth in Texas Prisons, 42 CRIME &
DELINQ. 593, 598-600 (1996).
170. See Feld, supra note 2, at 474-78.
171. Bishop et al., supra note 122, at 171; Winner et al., supra note 122, at 548.
172. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989).
173. See id. at 1.
174. See, e.g., RONALD L. AKERS, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL LEARNING APPROACH
(1985); JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985).
175. See, e.g., HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE

(1963); EDWIN M. LEMERT, HUMAN DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL CONTROL
(1967); EDWIN M. SCHUR, RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION: RETHINKING THE DELINQUENCY

PROGRAM (1973).
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theory,'77 and subcultural theory. 1 78 Finally, Braithwaite is not necessarily opposed to either punishment or due process protections. 7 9
In general terms, Braithwaite argues that shaming that is reintegrative and
forgiving works better to prevent or deter crime than shaming that is
stigmatizing and condemnatory. 8 ° Shaming is reintegrative if it communicates that the person being punished is still considered to be part of the
group.' 8' Thus, the disapproval, even moral outrage in serious offense
situations, must be directed at the criminal act rather than the actor. In
contrast, shaming that stigmatizes operates to sever the offender from the
group. 182 Its message is exclusionary and unforgiving.
Formal shaming by the state is generally less reintegrative and therefore,
less effective than informal shaming, that is, the disapproval of friends,
family, and other members of one's immediate community. 83 Social
control works better if it is connected to interdependent networks between
offenders and conventional others, especially those with whom the offender
has close personal ties. 184 Braithwaite identifies the community, rather
than
85
the justice system, as the primary agent of effective crime control.
Networks of interdependency are the keys for making formal official
sanctions work. 86 For example, Braithwaite argues that specific deterrence
works best when the official sanction produces in offenders fear of being
shamed in the eyes of their intimates. 187 Intimates may include family,
friends, and other close personal associates. Deterrent effects will be greater
still when offenders are re-embraced by intimates to whom they are strongly
attached. 188 For Braithwaite, reintegrative shaming, including punishment
(even harsh punishment), provides chances for the offender to express
repentance and for conventional groups to punish the transgression and to
forgive the offender. 189 Under such circumstances the offender can be
reintegrated into conventional society.

176. See, e.g., TRAVIS

HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY

(1969).

177. See, e.g., ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1968).
178. See, e.g., ALBERT KIRCIDEL COHEN, DELINQUENT Boys: THE CULTURE OF THE GANG
(1955); DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT (1990); Walter B. Miller, Lower Class
Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency, 14 J. SOC. ISSUES 5 (1958).
179. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 172, at 150-57.

180.
181.
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183.
184.
185.
186.

See id. at 54-55.
See id. at 152-61.
Id. at 101.
See id. at 87.
See id. at 89-97.
Id. at 8.
See id. at 89-97.

187. See id. at 177-82.
188. See id. at 152-77.

189. See id. at 162-65.
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Braithwaite is not opposed to public shaming, condemnation, or even stiff
punishment. 9° His theory allows that all are sometimes necessary and can
have beneficial effects if they are reintegrative rather than stigmatizing in
tone and quality.' 9 Properly applied, shaming should put pressure not just
on juvenile offenders but on parents, teachers, and the community to
reinforce the moral outrage that is felt about criminal acts. 92 At the same
time, however, shaming should provide ways to reclaim the offender as a part
of the group. 193 If forgiveness and reintegration are accomplished, the
bonds between the offender and the community are strengthened.194
Braithwaite's theory provides a theoretical framework for understanding
the findings of the recidivism studies reported above, which indicate that
criminal processing of juvenile offenders may make things worse. One does
not have to accept current or past juvenile justice practices as being optimal
to learn from Braithwaite. 9 5 For present purposes, his major contribution
is to provide a framework for thinking about ways in which the juvenile
justice system may be more reintegrative, that is, less stigmatizing 96 and
disintegrative, than the criminal justice system. The two systems differ in
many respects.
First, compared with the adult system, the juvenile justice system
generates expectancies in both juveniles and officials about the potential for
change. However awkwardly, the juvenile justice system communicates a
message that young people can change and that dispositions they receive are
designed to facilitate change. The underlying message of habilitation and
rehabilitation is a positive, forward-looking one which anticipates integration.
In contrast, the dominant message of today's offense-based criminal justice
system is negative and backward-looking. It is preoccupied with punishment
and desert to the neglect of the consequences these have for the offender. In

190. See id. at 150-51.
191. See id.
192. Braithwaite does not hold the community solely or even primarily responsible for
crime by its youth. Id. at 5-12. When a member of a family, neighborhood, or a community
violates the law, however, the group shares some responsibility and deserves some shame
itself. Id. at 12. For Braithwaite, this community stake in shame provides an impetus for
reintegrative social control. Id. at 8. He notes that a shamed community or family will
transmit the shame in the most reintegrative and, therefore, most effective way. Id. at 184-86.
The more immediate institutions (family, school, church) and intimate groups are better able
to dispense disapproval/shame without rejecting the offender. Id.
193. See id. at 84-89.
194. See id. at 29, 84-89.
195. In fact, Braithwaite's framework provides insight into how the juvenile justice system
could be made both more effective through reintegrative shaming. Others also discuss ways
to improve juvenile justice in a manner that is consistent with Braithwaite. Simon I. Singer,
Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 377 (1991).

in

196. Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice: Some Observations on a Recent Trend,
THE NEW JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 168, at 103.
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so doing, it eschews reclamation as a goal. In other words, the criminal
justice system stops at stigmatizing shaming.
Second, compared with the juvenile court, the criminal court is more
likely to incarcerate offenders.197 Sanctions that move an offender away
from home and community disrupt family, school, and other networks and
attachments. These disruptions directly contribute to recidivism. 198 In
addition, inmate groups to which offenders are exposed in institutions
become more attractive because ties to the conventional community are
broken. Inmate groups provide subcultural support for crime. 99
Third, compared with the adult correctional system, the juvenile system
tends to rely on smaller facilities that are built on community models, for
example, halfway houses, group homes, wilderness camps, Upward Bound,
and VisionQuest. 2 00 Although traditional "reform schools" are large-scale
institutions that have impacts like their criminal counterparts,2 ° 1 the clear
trend in the last twenty years has been to shut down these institutions and
replace them with small residential facilities. 2 No comparable movement
has occurred in criminal corrections. To the contrary, adult institutions have
grown in number and size.20 3 According to Braithwaite, formal, large-scale
penal institutions implemented outside the community, like those characteristic of the criminal justice system, are less effective, in part, because they are
detached from informal social control networks.2 0 4 Another difference
between juvenile and adult correctional institutions is the relative emphasis
accorded to custody and population management. Concerns about custody
and control inevitably become primary in large institutions like those

197. See

SINGER,

supra note 3, at 133-44.

198. Positive ties to the family, the school, and the workplace alter criminal career
trajectories. See ROBERT
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PRISON (1958); Gresham M. Sykes & Sheldon L. Messinger, The Inmate Social System, in
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al. eds., 1960).
200. See F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, HANDLING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

CASES 217-27 (1982).
201. BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN
INSTITUTIONS (1977); Charles W. Thomas et al., The Impact of Confinement on Juveniles, 14

YOUTH & SOC'Y 301 (1983).
202. ROBERT B. COATES ET

AL., DIVERSITY IN A YOUTH CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM (1982);
BARRY KRISBERG, UNLOCKING JUVENILE CORRECTIONS (1991); KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra

note 60; Robert B. Coates, The Future of Corrections in Juvenile Justice, in JUVENILE
JUSTICE: POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND SERVICES 281 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 1989).
203. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 172, at 116.

204. See id. at 179-80.
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characteristic of the adult system. 20 5 Regimentation of behavior, separation
of inmates, and rigid authority structures become central organizing
principles. All of these may serve custodial purposes, but they also constitute
obstacles to reintegration. "The regimen and realities of the society 2of
06
captives have little or nothing in common with life in the wider society.
Now that juvenile corrections has moved toward small community-based
residential programs, it offers more potential for reintegrative shaming.
Fourth, while programming in juvenile corrections leaves much to be
desired, the juvenile system offers more community-oriented and communitybased programs than does the adult system. 20 7 Even within juvenile
institutions, the programming emphasis is on skills that are directly applicable
to life in the community, for example, academic and vocational education,
communication and interpersonal skills, behavioral management, and jobseeking and job retention skills. 20 8 A growing body of research indicates
that recidivism is lower for community-based programs. 2°9
Fifth, proponents of the labeling and societal reaction perspectives have
long warned about the negative consequences of formal sanctions for young
offenders. 210 The stigma attached to a criminal conviction potentially
makes it all the more difficult for young offenders to restore positive images
of self and to integrate into the law-abiding community. 21' "While being
branded 'delinquent' by a punitive juvenile system is surely stigmatic, it may
well carry fewer negative connotations, both in the minds of offenders and
to the community at large, than flow from being convicted a 'criminal' by
the adult court. 21 2 The effects that flow from the stigmatizing label may
be the greatest obstacle to reintegration, and these are greatest for criminal

205. FREDA ADLER ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE CORE 311 (1996); see also DAVID
STREET ET AL., ORGANIZATION FOR TREATMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR DELINQUENTS (1966). "A very strong concern for security marks the U.S. prison today.
Maximum security prisons are dedicated solely to that purpose. Medium security prisons have
a somewhat more relaxed attitude but still emphasize security. Only minimum security
prisons subordinate security to institutional programs." ADLER ET AL., supra at 311.
206. CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 60, at 114.
207. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
208. Research has shown that juveniles sentenced and incarcerated as adults are less likely
to receive basic education and job training services than those committed to training schools.
Martin Forst et al., Youth in Prisonsand Training Schools: Perceptionsand Consequences of
the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 39 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1989).
209. KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 60; BARRY KRISBERG ET AL., THE IMPACT OF
JUVENILE COURT SANCTIONS (1988); Lipsey, supra note 59, at 83; Andrews et al., supra note
59, at 369. But see ROBERT B. COATES ET AL., DIVERSITY IN A YOUTH CORRECTIONAL
SYSTEM (1978); DENISE C. GOTrFREDSON & WILLIAM H. BARTON, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1992).
210. See Gardner, supra note 196, at 103.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 112.
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offenders, as was recognized in Kent.213 Stigma disrupts the ties that may
play a central role in correcting and redirecting the offender's future
behavior.
Research supports the proposition that changes in criminal propensity are
related to changes in personal relationships (for example, a stable marriage),
social circumstances, and employment.2 14 Job marketability is especially
adversely affected by a criminal conviction. Often occupational licenses
require the absence of a criminal record, automatically barring adult convicts
from those fields.2 15 Many states block convicted felons from holding
public office, and many more prohibit ex-cons from public jobs.216 Even
where legal impediments do not exist, social ones do. Employers are
reluctant to hire applicants with criminal records.2 17
Finally, Braithwaite incorporates Matza's concern with how juveniles,
218
adrift from conventional society, adopt attitudes that foster delinquency.
"The subculture of delinquency is ...

a memory file that collects injus-

219

tices.
Matza argues that a sense of injustice develops among delinquents when they perceive unfairness in how they are processed.22 ° To the
extent that offenders perceive formal processing as unjust, they become less
integrated into the community. 221 Subsequent delinquency has been linked
to Matza's formulation of a sense of injustice.2 22 Others also have
documented how perceptions of procedural unfairness contribute to
crime.223
Singer reports that transferred juveniles have a sense of
injustice.224 He states: "They viewed their sentences not just as a product
of their offenses; they questioned the motives and competencies of criminal
justice officials. They compared themselves not with adult offenders but
with other juveniles. 225

213. Kent v. United States, 393 U.S. 541 (1967). The Kent opinion reviews ways in which

the criminal processing is different in terms of sanction, confidentiality, civil "death," and job
prospects. See id. at 554-57.
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217. Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 Soc.
PROBS. 133, 136 (1962).
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220. See id. at 101-04.
221. See id. at 181-92.
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225. Id. at 176.

1998]

JUVENILE JUSTICE UNDER ATTACK

V.

CONCLUSIONS

We have tried to contribute to the debate on juvenile justice reform in
three ways. First, we reviewed the forces and rationales that initiated and
sustain the criminalization of juveniles. Second, we interjected empirical
research on recidivism into the discussion. Third, we have shown how a
general theory integrates the recidivism findings and other evidence to
suggest implications for practice and justice and to provide insight into
policy.
Our analysis suggests that the forces of reform need to incorporate
empirical research. The empirical record is, in fact, inconsistent with both
the direction and pace of the juvenile justice reform movement. The best
available evidence indicates that the rush to impose adult status on juveniles
is neither reducing juvenile crime nor enhancing public safety. Thus, we
recommend a moratorium on the criminalization of juvenile offenders so that
a more informed policy can emerge. Specifically, we call for (1) more
reasoned and systematic analyses of crime data, especially crimes of violence,
(2) research on the effectiveness of alternative strategies of crime control as
they apply to juveniles, and (3) effective dissemination of the information.
An informed policy will require active involvement by more scholars in
the public policy arena. 26 Academic researchers and legal scholars can
affect the opinions and actions of legislators, as well as public opinion, if
they are relatively united, if they succeed in defining issues clearly and
specifically, and if they maintain credibility by closely relating their
recommendations to research findings. 2 7 According to Jerome Skolnick,
"[o]ur task as criminologists, is to bring evidence and reasoned discussion to
the debate over crime control, to inform the public about . . . 'alternatives
and payoffs,' and to move the discussion from 'raw opinion' to 'responsible
public judgment.' ,228

226. Some scholars and commentators have already pointed the way. KRISBERG & AUSTIN,
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